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In the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper of 23rd March 2005 the economics writer Ross Gittins argued
that the funding arrangements for private schools in Australia positively encourage parents to move their
children from the state system to the private system. The Federal minister, Dr Brendan Nelson, responded
by saying that the policy of subsidising pupils who go to a private school results in taxpayer savings of $4
billion. However, the minister's response did not address the extent to which more funds could possibly
be saved by having a different subsidy from the one currently offered by the government. Now, there are
two conflicting factors in offering subsidies to private school pupils. On the one hand, the greater the
subsidy per pupil, the more pupils will enroll in private schools. On the other hand, the greater the subsidy
per pupil the less money will be saved each time a pupil enrolls in a private school. How do these factors
balance out, and where would an optimal subsidy occur? The problem is closely related to other problems
of optimisation that arise in business, industry and public policy. Mathematically, the problem can be
modelled, at the level of school mathematics, by means of a quadratic function that describes how the
savings to the taxpayer change as the subsidy changes. Further details are on the author’s website at
http://www.uow.edu.au/~nillsen
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An application of quadratic functions to
Australian Government policy on funding schools
Rodney Nillsen
School of Mathematics and Applied Statistics
University of Wollongong
In the Sydney Morning Herald of 23rd March 2005 Ross Gittins [1] argued that
the funding arrangements for private schools positively encourage parents to move
their children from the state system. The Federal Minister for Education, Dr Brendan
Nelson, in a letter to the Herald of 25th 27 th March, responded by saying that 68% of
all school pupils go to state schools, and those students receive 76% of Government
funds allocated to the totality of all pupils attending schools. He stated also that the
policy of subsidizing pupils who went to a private school resulted in taxpayer savings
of $4 billion [2]. However, the Minister’s response did not address the extent to which
more money could possibly be saved by having a different subsidy from the one
currently offered by the Government.
There are two conflicting factors in offering subsides to private school pupils.
On the one hand, the greater the subsidy per pupil the more pupils will enrol in private
schools. On the other hand, the greater the subsidy per pupil the less money will be
saved each time a pupil enrols in a private school. How do these factors balance out,
and where would an optimal subsidy occur? The problem is closely related to other
problems of optimization that arise in business, industry and public policy.
Mathematically, the problem can be modelled by means of a quadratic function that
describes how the savings change as the subsidy changes.
Calculation of the current subsidy
Let m pupils go to state schools and n pupils go to private schools. Then, the
proportion of pupils going to state schools is , where
m
=
.
(1)
m+ n
Assume that for each state school pupil, the Government will pay an amount a. Assume
also that for each private school pupil, the Government will subsidise that pupil at an
amount s. The proportion of Government funds spent on the state school system, out of
the total of all Government funds spent on both state and private schools is , where
ma
.
ma + ns
A routine calculation using (1) and (2) gives
=

s
=
a
The Minister’s figures in the Herald [2] give
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. Based on this and
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2
allowing for round-off in the Minister’s figures, we have from (3) that
2
s = a.
3

(4)

The mathematical analysis of savings
Since the Government pays an amount a for each state school pupil and pays a
subsidy s for each private school pupil, for each private pupil, the Government saves an
amount a s. At the subsidy s , let g (s ) denote the number of pupils who enrol in
private schools. The function g is taken to be increasing for, if a greater subsidy is
offered, a greater number of pupils would be expected to enrol in the private system.
Then, the total amount saved by the Government is a s for each pupil times g (s ) , the
number of pupils in the private system. So, the total amount saved with the subsidy s is
S (s ) , where
S ( s ) = g ( s)( a s).
(5)
Note that S ( s ) 0 and S ( a ) = 0. In (5), formally s can take any real value, but it is
assumed that the subsidy offered by the Government lies in the interval [0,a], for a
negative subsidy would mean a tax on people sending their children to a private school,
while a subsidy greater than a would mean the Government would be paying more for a
pupil going to private school than to a state school. Equation (5) shows that the savings
function S is comprised of two contradictory tendencies, for g (s ) increases as s
increases, but a s decreases as s increases.
Savings will be maximised when the function S has a maximum over the
interval [0, a] . A Government wishing to maximise savings without regard for
anything else should try to find the level of subsidy where this maximum will occur.
The simplest choice for g is a linear function. We let N 0 be the number of

pupils who enrol in the private system when the subsidy is zero. Thus, N 0 = g(0). The
value of N 0 is a matter of controversy, with some letter writers to the Sydney Morning
Herald holding that it is in effect 0 [3], while others hold that subsidies have little
effect and that g(s) is always close to N 0 [4]. Also, define N 0 by putting N 0 = g(a) .

Thus, N 0 is the number of private school pupils who would enrol under the maximum
subsidy a and we assume that N 0 > N 0 . Thus, g is given in the linear case by
g(s) = N 0 +

N0

N0
a

s.

(6)

N0
. If N 0 = 0 , let
N0
= . Thus, > 1 and measures the “sensitivity” of the “market” to subsidies.
For the time being, is kept as a given constant value, and we shall think later
about what happens as varies. It follows from (5) and (6) and a routine calculation
that the savings are given by
DEFINITION. If N 0 > 0 make the definition that

S(s) = N 0 +

N0

N0
a

s (a s) =

N0
a

(a + (

)

=

1)s (a s),

(7)

so that S is a quadratic function in s. Hence, we know that the point where S has an

3
overall maximum is the midpoint of the zeros of S .

Figure 1. Let g(s) be the number of private school enrolments at the
subsidy s per pupil. The figure shows the graph of g where g is assumed
linear.

a
, so S has an overall
1
maximum value at the mid-point of these two zeros, namely it has a maximum at
a
2
(8)
.
2
1
Note that this point where the maximum occurs is negative if < 2 , is 0 if = 2 , and
We see from (7) that the zeros of S are at a and

a
if > 2 . As increases, the point where the overall maximum occurs
2
increases, changing from negative to positive at = 2 (see Figures 2 and 3). However,
we are interested in the maximum value of S(s) for 0 s a . We put
is in 0,

S max = max{S(s) : 0

Thus, if 1 <
gives
a
S max = S
2

=

N0
a

a+(

1)

a
2

a}.

> 2 , a routine calculation using (8)

2 , S max = S(0) = aN 0 ; while if
2
1

s

2
1

a

a
2

2
1

=

aN 0
4(

Now, we saw in (4) that the subsidy offered by the Government is s =

2

1)

.

(9)

2a
, so the
3

2a
, and we call this value Sgov. We
3
let be a given number in [0,1) , and first we calculate the difference between the
maximum possible savings and the savings at the subsidy a . That is, we calculate
S max S( a) . There are two cases to consider: 1<
2 and > 2 .

savings under current Government policy are S

4

Figure 2. The graph is of the savings S against the subsidy s , in a case where
1 < < 2 . Note that the overall maximum value of the savings is at the

a
2

2
, indicated by the dotted vertical line, while
1
the maximum value of S(s) for 0 s a occurs when s = 0 . The graph
illustrates that as
increases from 1 to 2 , the subsidy at which the
maximum savings S max occur remains the same at s = 0 .

negative value

s=

Figure 3. The graph is of the savings S against the subsidy s when
2.
In this case, the overall maximum savings are the same as the maximum
savings

S max for 0

a , and occur when s =

s

the dotted vertical line, which is between

0 and

a
2

2
, indicated by
1

a
a
. Note that
is half the
2
2

maximum possible subsidy. Figures 2 and 3 together illustrate that as
increases from
occur is at

1 to

, the subsidy at which the maximum savings

s = 0 for 1 <

2 , and then it increases to s =

a
as
2

S max
.
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We illustrate what happens in the case > 2 . A routine calculation based on (7),
(8) and (9) gives
2
Smax
1
Smax S( a) = S( a)
1 = S( a)
1 . (10)
S( a)
4(
1) (1+ (
1) )(1 )
2
, equation (10) simplifies to
3
2a
2a 1 2 + 4 + 4
Smax S gov = S max S
=S
.
3
3 4 2 2
1
2 gives
A similar calculation in the case 1<
=

In particular, when

Smax

S gov = S max

S

2a
2a
=S
3
3

8 2
.
2 +1

(11)

(12)

Now put
8 2
1 2+4 +4
, for 1<
2; and u( ) =
, for 2 < < .
4 2 2
2 +1
1
Differentiating u with respect to shows that u is decreasing and we see also that
u( )
1/8 as
. The following result is then immediate from (11) and (12).
THEOREM. For all 1 < < ,
u( ) =

Smax
The value of

S gov = u( )S gov

1
S .
8 gov

which would give the impression that current Government

policy is trying to save the maximum possible amount is when Smax

1
. According to
8
= $ 4 billion. Thus, at the Government’s current subsidy level, and

minimum: that is when
the Minister, S gov

S gov is a

=

, corresponding to N 0 = 0 and u( ) =

according to the linear model, and assuming

=

, we have

1
1
S gov = S gov = × 4 × 109 dollars = $500 million.
8
8
In fact, it follows from the theorem above that whatever the value of ,
Smax

Smax

S gov

$500 million.

Thus, under the linear model, $500 million is the smallest amount more that can be
saved compared with what the Government is currently saving. In fact, this amount is
most likely greater, as the actual value of is almost certainly comparatively small,

which means that at the actual value of

, Smax

S gov is likely to be substantially

greater than $500 million. In fact, we can try and estimate from the Minister’s data.
We let N be the total number of pupils in the combined state and private systems. We
2a
8N
know from the Minister’s figures that
= .32N = g
, so (6) gives
3
25
8
2
N = N0 + N0
25
3

N0 =

N 0 2N 0
+
.
3
3
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Hence,
=

N0
N0

=

3 8 N
2 25 N 0

1
12 N
=
3
25 N 0

1
.
2

(13)

Although it seems difficult to estimate , we may feel more comfortable in estimating
N0
, which is the ratio telling us the proportion of school pupils who would go to a
N
private school even if there were no subsidy. For example if we think that 20% of pupils
would go to private schools even if there were no subsidy, (13) would give = 1.9 , and
then the equation Smax

S gov = u( )S gov tells us that the Government could save $3,500

million more than it currently is, under the linear model. However, if we think that 10%
of pupils would go to private schools even if there were no subsidy, the Government
could save $1,252 million more than it currently is, under the linear model.
Limitations of the analysis and conclusions
If the function g is assumed non-linear the point where savings are maximised
may be quite different from that in the linear case. However, the linear model is widely
used in economics. The analysis takes no account of the differing circumstances
between different schools, nor does the analysis take account of the splitting of school
funding between state and federal Governments. The analysis is based solely on the
three items of data given by the Minister. Even so, the analysis is strongly suggestive
that the saving of public funds in this area is an incidental effect of policy, rather than its
purpose. The analysis presented here is a particular approach to what is a special case of
a supply and demand problem. Such problems occur widely wherever one is tying to
optimise a quantity in the face of conflicting tendencies and, with appropriate changes,
possibly they may be tackled by an adaptation of the techniques described in this paper.
Three possible areas are: maximising profit in retailing, where there are conflicting
tendencies between the price of an item and the number of items one can expect to sell
at that price; taxation policy, where there are conflicting tendencies between the
amount of income tax collected and the incentive to work (this is related to the “Laffer
curve” which featured in tax policy under US President Ronald Reagan); and university
enrolments, where there are conflicting tendencies between the cost to a student of
enrolling and the number of students who enrol. Further details of the analysis and
material related to school mathematics may be found on the author’s website (see
below).
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